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ABSTRACT
The growing overlap between three important phenomena—the increasingly widespread use of social media 
(especially as a tool for political communication), the current populist zeitgeist (as described by Cas Mudde), 
and the rise of right-wing nationalism—make the question of how social media can be employed as a plat-
form for the amplification of populist-nationalist discourse particularly pressing. This paper explores the af-
fordances of social media that allow for its employment in the creation and propagation of populist-nation-
alist discourse, particularly the elective affinity between social media and populism, the way that social 
media can provide a platform for the emotive element of populist-nationalist discourse, and how social me-
dia can facilitate the amplification of conspiratorial thinking (characteristic of right-wing populism). To fur-
ther elucidate this theoretical discussion, this paper will also explore Donald Trump’s online discourse sur-
rounding the 2018 migrant caravan as a case study. Ultimately, this paper highlights how social media 
has provided an effective medium for the increasing interplay between nationalist and populist discourse. 
Social Media and the Construction and Propagation of 
Populist-Nationalist Discourse
By Paula A. Pineda1
1Yale University
INTRODUCTION
While theoretically distinct, nationalist and populist discourses can 
overlap in significant ways in political practice. With the election 
of Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, we 
have increasingly seen how social media may be employed as a 
tool for political communication that incorporates and activates the 
kind of sentiments that characterize populist nationalism: anti-elit-
ism, nativism, conspiratorial thinking, among others. This paper 
explores how social media has functioned effectively as a site for 
the interplay between nationalist and populist discourse: particular-
ly, this paper looks at the elective affinity between social media and 
populism and the way that social media can provide a platform for 
the emotive aspect of populist-nationalist discourse. I will also pay 
particular attention to the question of how conspiratorial thinking 
and conspiratorial narratives can be quickly disseminated and am-
plified through social media platforms. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the theoretical distinc-
tions between nationalist discourse and populist discourse. It then 
explores the affordances of social media that have allowed it to 
become a site for the interplay between nationalist and populist dis-
course, paying particular attention to the elective affinity between 
populism and social media, to the role of emotion within social 
media platforms and in populist-nationalist rhetoric, and to the rel-
evance of conspiracy theory for populist discourses and social me-
dia’s ability to facilitate its dissemination. To further elucidate this 
theoretical discussion, this paper will then explore Donald Trump’s 
online discourse surrounding the 2018 migrant caravan as a case 
study. 
This case study will also highlight how social media can function as 
a site for the spread of misinformation and fake news, contributing 
to the conspiratorial element of populism. The extent of the influ-
ence of social media in the construction and propagation of popu-
list-nationalist discourse should not be overstated and requires fur-
ther examination before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. 
At the same time, as we continue to see increasing overlap between 
three salient phenomena—the increasingly widespread use of so-
cial media (especially as a tool for political communication), the 
current “populist zeitgeist”i  (as Cas Mudde has defined it), and the 
rise of right-wing nationalism—the question of how social media 
can be employed as a platform for the amplification of populist-na-
tionalist discourse becomes more pressing, particularly when we 
consider how using social media platforms could work towards 
further blurring the empirical boundaries between nationalist and 
populist discourse. 
POPULISM AND NATIONALISM: PRACTICAL OVERLAPS AND 
CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
Before delving into a closer examination of social media as a site of 
interplay between nationalist and populist discourse, it is important 
to arrive at a clearer understanding of the conceptual distinctions 
between the two discourses. In recent years, the election of various 
“populist” leaders on a global scale—including the United States’ 
Donald Trump, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, and Mexico’s Andrés Man-
uel López Obrador—has contributed to the rise of populism to the 
forefront of global discussions on the political sphere. The appli-
cation of the populist label has often been complicated due to its 
conflation with the strong nationalistic elements present in these 
leaders’ rhetoric. It is this conflation, and the ensuing confusion, 
i The “populist Zeitgeist,” a term coined by populism scholar Cas Mudde, refers 
to the phenomenon of populist discourse “becom[ing] mainstream in the politics of 
contemporary western democracies” (Mudde, 2004, p. 562).
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that makes assessing the relationship and distinctions between na-
tionalism and populism critical for academic conversations. While 
some scholars have argued in favor of a thicker definition of popu-
lism that sees it as having a nationalist dimension, claiming it more 
effectively relays the “productive ambiguity” that characterizes the 
rhetoric of appealing to “the people” (a defining element of popu-
lism), others have posited that in order to more clearly grasp how 
nationalism and populism interact practically, we  must “start from 
a clear conceptual distinction” between them (Brubaker, 2020, 
p. 44; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020, p. 317). While adopting a 
thicker definition has some merits, it ultimately produces too much 
ambiguity between the two discourses; arriving at clear conceptual 
distinctions between nationalism and populism proves useful not 
only in understanding them theoretically, but also in informing our 
perception of how these discourses intersect and interact in prac-
tice. This section will provide an overview of the theoretical dis-
tinctions between the two discourses. 
The overlap between the two discourses can be observed empir-
ically in various instances; in fact, many of the most well-known 
occurrences of “populist politics” have had nationalist elements, 
such as the “populist radical right and most of the Latin American 
populisms” (De Cleen, 2017, p. 1). Latin American literature on the 
subject has traditionally regarded “nationalism as integral to pop-
ulism” (Brubaker, 2020, p. 45). The radical right is characterized 
by a combination of “populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism” 
(Bonikowski et al., 2019, p. 59). The example of Latin America 
highlights why some scholars have argued in favor of a theoretical 
conflation between nationalism and populism when “the distinction 
between the people and the elite is both moral and ethnic” (Mudde 
& Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 14). Nonetheless, while merging these con-
cepts may better reflect elements of the practical reality, it does a 
disservice to understanding them conceptually in a nuanced manner. 
While scholarship on populism has conceptualized it in various 
ways—namely, populism as political strategy (Weyland, 2017, p. 
3), populism as an ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 5-6), 
among others—this paper understands populism as a kind of dis-
course (Brubaker, 2020; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020; Laclau, 
2005). Primarily, populism is characterized by the construction of 
“the people” against a corrupt or illegitimate elite (Mudde & Rovi-
ra Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 11-12). On the other hand, nationalist dis-
course centers on constructing an in-group (the nation) and an out-
group (non-members of the nation), and particularly, constructs the 
nation as limited and as a community; nationalist discourse, unlike 
the discourse that characterizes populism, is not anti-elitist in and 
of itself (De Cleen, 2017, pp. 4-5).  The construction of in-groups 
and out-groups is not specific to nationalism; it is the particular way 
that the nation is constructed—as limited, as a community, and as 
De Cleen would argue, sovereign (with independent decision-mak-
ing capabilities that are free from interference)— that further clari-
fies the particularities of nationalist discourse (De Cleen, 2017, pp. 
4-5). The “nation” as a discursive signifier (De Cleen, 2019, p. 4) 
or as an “organizing principle” (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 7) is the essen-
tial component that structures nationalist discourse. The nation’s 
status as the in-group is established and solidified by a “shared time 
(a shared past, present, and future) and space (a shared territory 
with borders and certain characteristics)” (De Cleen, 2017, p. 5). 
This conceptualization of the nation illuminates our understanding 
of the particular ways through which the in-group of nationalist 
discourse is constructed; this construction, unlike with populist dis-
course, is not inherently anti-elitist. 
Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis’ spatial framework for 
understanding the conceptual distinctions between populism and 
nationalism is particularly compelling. Within a spatial plane, pop-
ulism is “structured around a vertical, down/up axis that refers to 
power, status and hierarchical position” while nationalism is situ-
ated “along a horizontal in/out axis that distinguishes…members 
from non-members,” differentiating between “the own nation from 
other nations” (De Cleen, 2017, p. 7; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 
2020, p. 315). This spatial framework facilitates the visualization of 
key definitional aspects of nationalism and populism—horizontal 
in-group/out-group construction and the hierarchical antagonism 
between “the people” and an illegitimate elite, respectively. Impor-
tantly, nationalist discourse may construct the nation in terms of in- 
and out- racial or ethnic groups and while certain populisms may 
also imbue “the people” with a racial or ethnic dimension, pop-
ulism is mainly concerned with the vertical antagonism between 
“the people” (in its different forms, including racially constructed 
forms) and an elite that is perceived as illegitimate. Working with 
this understanding of the conceptual distinctions between national-
ism and populism will allow for a clearer discussion of social media 
as a site suited for the interplay between the two discourses. 
SOCIAL MEDIA: A SITE OF INTERPLAY FOR NATIONALIST 
AND POPULIST DISCOURSE 
Elective Affinity Between Social Media And Populism 
As posited by Paolo Gerbaudo, the “mass networking capabilities 
of social media...provide a suitable channel for the mass politics 
and the appeals to the people [that are] typical of populism” (2018, 
p. 745). Gerbaudo describes recent instances where social media 
played a role in populist movements—including “Nigel Farage’s 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Marine Le Pen’s Front Nation-
al’’ on the Right and Bernie Sanders in the U.S. and “the rise of Po-
demos in Spain” on the Left—and refers to the phenomenon as an 
“‘elective affinity’ between social media and populism”; he argues 
that social media has worked in favor of populist movements and 
“against establishment movements by providing the former a suit-
able channel to invoke the support of ordinary people against the 
latter” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 746). Importantly, he situates this phe-
nomenon of elective affinity within the context of “the convergence 
of two global trends”: an era of “rapid technological development” 
and the “profound economic crisis shaking the legitimacy of the 
neoliberal order”; this convergence has allowed for populism to 
manifest in the significant way that it has in the political sphere of 
the digital era (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 746; Postill, 2018, pp. 754-755).
 
The convergence of fast-paced technological innovation and wors-
ening economic conditions mentioned above can create a space for 
populists to appeal to “digitally connected and politically disgrun-
tled [electorates]” through social media (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 748). 
Social media can be used to communicate populist rhetoric as “a 
means of recruiting disaffected citizens,” particularly by channel-
ing common populist themes like “emphasizing the sovereignty of 
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the people; advocating for the people; attacking the elites; ostraciz-
ing [those who do not belong to the dominant group]; and invoking 
the heartlands’’ (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1109; Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 
747). There are two main factors that have contributed to social me-
dia’s propensity for populist appeals: how the perception of social 
media as “a voice for the underdog...in opposition to mainstream 
news media” has constructed a narrative that favors populist move-
ments and how social media “provides means of ‘crowd-building’” 
that rallies “politically disaffected individuals around evocative 
symbols and leaders and against common ‘enemies of the people,’” 
which are most commonly imagined to be the elites in power (Ger-
baudo, 2018, p. 748). These two factors will be discussed in more 
detail below.
“Traditional mass media,” a term that is used interchangeably in this 
paper alongside “mainstream media,” refers to traditional forms of 
media, including print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast 
(television and radio), that serve as popular communication chan-
nels, “influence large numbers of people, and are likely to represent 
generally accepted beliefs and opinions” (Hongcharu & Eiamkan-
chanalai, 2009; Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.).   Traditional mass me-
dia channels, which, at least in theory, must “adhere to professional 
norms and news values,” have been criticized over the perception 
that they are simply extensions of the “financial and political estab-
lishment” (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1110; Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 749). 
In opposition to this perception of mainstream media as serving 
elite interests, social media has emerged as a “direct linkage to the 
people,” allowing “populists to circumvent...journalistic gatekeep-
ers” (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1110). While the narrative that social 
media provides a space to circumvent the traditional establishment 
is problematic—given that social media platforms themselves are 
“controlled by gigantic capitalist companies” with “profit-driven 
agendas”— these platforms have nonetheless unquestionably pro-
vided a “channel for individual expressions” devoid of “interme-
diation [from traditional] news media” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 749). 
Thus, despite that social media platforms’ ownership and manage-
ment is dominated by the elites, the public may be more inclined to 
trust social media as “the people’s voice” since they perceive it as 
more distant from the establishment compared to traditional media, 
even if this may not entirely be the case in actuality. 
The increased trust of social media as the “people’s voice” coupled 
with the decline in authority of traditional news sources contributes 
toward setting the stage for “new actors to enter the space of news 
and opinion-making,” facilitating the communication of populist 
(and often populist-nationalist) rhetoric (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 749). 
Importantly, the creation of “alternative news channels,” which “set 
the psychological conditions for...electoral mobilisation,” have of-
ten preceded populist movements (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 750). This 
further highlights the role that social media may play within pop-
ulist movements, establishing itself as a method for communicat-
ing and amplifying the “voice of the people” (Gerbaudo, 2018, pp. 
749-750).
Social media’s elective affinity with populism can also be observed 
in the “aggregation logic embedded in its algorithms and the way 
it can focus the attention of an otherwise dispersed people” (Ger-
baudo, 2018, p. 750). Social media supplies “gathering spaces” that 
contribute to the creation of “political communit[ies]” in the form 
of “online crowds”; this formation is facilitated by the “algorithms 
of social media and its aggregative capabilities,” such as the “fil-
ter bubble effect” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 750). More specifically, the 
filter bubble effect refers to the focusing of users’ attention on con-
tents that match their particular interests; by filtering information in 
this way, the filter bubble effect can favor “a polarisation of public 
opinion” due to the way it “restricts users’ attention on content” 
that is aligned with “their existing ideological standpoints while 
insulating them from alternative views” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 750). 
While potentially concerning—due to their propensity to “exacer-
bate [existing] social divisions”—filter bubbles can be productive 
for populism because of their “mobilising effect,” aiding in the cre-
ation of “online crowds of like-minded” people, in other words, 
aiding in the construction of “the people” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 750).
 
Therefore, populism finds its elective affinity with social media 
through the perception of social media as being less beholden to 
elite influence (compared to traditional media sources), and thus as 
a valid platform for the “voice of the people,” as well as through 
social media’s “crowd-building” capabilities, which are heightened 
by the effects of algorithmic filtering and “filter bubbles” (Gerbau-
do, 2018, pp. 748-750). While Gerbaudo recognizes further work 
needs to be conducted to arrive at a clearer understanding of this 
elective affinity, the aforementioned factors provide a good start to-
wards better understanding the relationship between social media 
and populism. One factor that should also be considered is the role 
of emotion, both within populist and nationalist appeals. The fol-
lowing section will explore the potential relationship between social 
media and the emotive element of populist-nationalist discourse.
Social Media and Populist Nationalism: The Role of Emotion  
While often disregarded and considered outside the rational and 
structural kind of political analysis that should characterize social 
science, studying the role of emotions can provide significant in-
sights into the construction and adoption of populist-nationalism 
as well as its potential relationship with social media (Goodwin 
et al., 2001, p. 1). Populist and nationalist discourses both invoke 
emotions as a key component of their messages: nationalism’s “af-
fective dimension” is employed in the horizontal construction of in- 
and out- groups, and “embod[ies] the semipermeable line between 
love and hate in the political sphere,” while political discussions 
on populism frequently connect populist sentiment to fear and an-
ger (Goodwin et al., 2001, p. 85; Rico et al., 2017, p. 444). Social 
media can be conceptualized as a “global multiplier through which 
emotional experiences are shared and strengthened,” allowing for 
emotions, which are felt at an individual level, to be “simultaneous-
ly shared with and by others” (Jalonen, 2014, p. 53). It is the cen-
trality of emotion within both populist-nationalist discourse and so-
cial media platforms that facilitates the interplay between the two. 
As established earlier, populist discourse “involves an appeal to the 
entirety of the political community against [the] common enemy 
[of the] unresponsive political elites” while nationalist discourse 
creates a common enemy through the horizontal construction of 
in- and out- groups (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020, p. 315; Ger-
baudo, 2018, p. 747). Populist-nationalist (i.e. right-wing populist) 
discourse, which generally is “highly exclusionary and xenopho-
bic,” constructs the empty signifier of “the people” “in opposition 
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to migrants and ethnic and religious minorities”; it also is often 
characterized by “a claim to speak for working people, whose in-
terests are no longer well represented by traditional parties” and by 
“a call for a return to (an invented) ‘tradition’” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 
747; Gusterson, 2017, p. 210; Laclau, 2005). Therefore, the emo-
tive element of this discourse is present in various forms: the fear, 
anger and anxiety that surrounds “the people’s” constructed per-
ception of out-groups (religious and ethnic minorities); the indigna-
tion towards an elite perceived as “illegitimate”; and the nostalgiaii 
embedded in populist calls for a past “(invented) tradition” (Guster-
son, 2017, p. 210; Hameleers et al., 2016, p. 870; Kazin, 1995, p. 
39; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 11-12).  
Because social media has been found to be a site that is particularly 
well-suited for the propagation of emotion, particularly negative 
emotion, it follows that social media platforms can be employed 
to propagate the kind of negative sentiments that characterize pop-
ulist-nationalist discourse in the non-virtual world. While it is not 
yet clear whether positive or negative emotions “dominate social 
media,” negativity bias may manifest in online interactions, with 
“psychological studies show[ing] that negative experience...has a 
greater impact on people than do neutral or positive experiences”—
with negative events “elicit[ing] stronger and quicker emotional, 
behavioral, and cognitive responses”—and that “negative emotions 
are more contagious than positive ones” (Jalonen, 2014, pp. 57-
58; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013, p. 224). Similarly, it has been 
found that “Twitter users who express...negative emotions [tend to] 
cluster together”; this can be helpful for the formation of groups 
that are unified through a cohesive narrative that employs negative 
emotion, as is the case with populist-nationalism (Quercia et al., 
2012, p. 1).
Social media can also be an effective tool for propagating the neg-
ative sentiments traditionally associated with populist-national-
ism because people are more likely to share emotionally charged 
content; a study conducted by Stefan Stieglitz and Linh Dang-Xu-
an found that “emotionally charged Twitter messages tend to be 
retweeted more often and more quickly compared to neutral ones” 
(2013, p. 217). Those who seek a platform for the spread of a pop-
ulist-nationalist agenda can thus potentially benefit from the use of 
social media not only because it can potentially reach vast num-
ii While nostalgia is not an inherently negative emotion, in this context, nostalgic 
motifs are employed with the aim of constructing a narrative that, while calling for 
a past time, is exclusionary of outside groups, like religious and ethnic minorities, 
and therefore employs negative (often xenophobic and nativist) sentiments; this 
connection between negative emotions and nostalgia is further highlighted by a 
study conducted by Eefje Steenvoorden and Eelco Harteveld which argues that 
“societally pessimistic [voters] are attracted to the nostalgic nature of the populist 
radical right” (2018, p. 28).
bers of people through interconnected social networks, but also be-
cause it favors the kind of emotionally-driven content found in their 
political agenda and rhetoric (including the release of anger and 
grievances towards an elite perceived as illegitimate, nativist and 
xenophobic constructions of ethnic and religious minorities, etc., 
as mentioned above).
Conspiracy Theories, Fake News, and the Construction of Popu-
list-Nationalist Discourse on Social Media  
Among the various factors that have been suggested as contributing 
towards, what Paolo Gerbaudo labels, Trump’s “digital prowess,” 
as well as his eventual political victory in the 2016 presidential 
elections, many have highlighted the crucial role of social media 
as a channel for “fake news”—intentionally false news reports that 
aim to disinform (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 746). While it is difficult to 
demonstrate what particular factors were the most significant and 
how impactful social media was in actuality, its use in populist 
movements and the fact that it is increasingly becoming more in-
tertwined with our political realities make this phenomenon worth-
while of further study.  
While the long and intricate history of conspiracy and populism is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the two often intersect in important 
ways: for example, both can activate and rely on anti-elitist senti-
ment (fostering “distrust of the establishment”) and can perpetu-
ate an “unnuanced” perception of the world as a “battlefield for an 
epic battle between good and evil that only those in the know can 
see” (Hendricks & Vestergaard, 2018, p. 94). Literature on popu-
lism today views populist rhetoric as one of “Manichean conflict, 
pitting “a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites 
and dangerous ‘others,’” a dividing sentiment that can be used to 
fuel “conspiratorial convictions” (defined by Vincent F. Hendricks 
and Mads Vestergaard as “a belief that an organization consisting 
of individuals or groups is plotting and acting in the dark in order to 
reach a specific goal that is often malignant”) (Boyte, 2020, p. 64; 
Hendricks & Vestergaard, 2018, p. 94).
Social media platforms can be utilized to quickly disseminate con-
spiratorial thinking and conspiratorial narratives, including through 
the rapid spread of fake news articles. This process is self-rein-
forcing: it has been found that Facebook users “with conspiracy 
convictions have a greater than average tendency to accept fake 
news and undocumented claims” (Hendricks & Vestergaard, 2018, 
p. 95). Thus, not only can social media work towards spreading 
and instilling conspiratorial narratives and ways of thinking, but 
it could also strengthen previously held conspiratorial convictions. 
When prominent populist leaders, who may enjoy large social me-
dia followings, contribute to the production and dissemination of 
these narratives, the impacts of these can be quickly amplified as 
they are repeatedly shared and posted.
CASE STUDY: DONALD TRUMP’S ONLINE RHETORIC AND 
THE 2018 MIGRANT CARAVAN  
The way in which these features of social media intersect with and 
multiply the impacts of political rhetoric that utilizes populist-na-
tionalist discourse can be observed in several case studies, includ-
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ing the campaign and administration of Donald Trump. Since his 
campaign for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump 
has continually employed elements of both populist and nation-
alist discourse, as evidenced by his most famous slogans “Make 
America Great Again” and “America First”: these slogans advance 
the construction and preservation of the nation while establishing 
a central group, “the people,” in this case presumably white Amer-
ican citizens. Additionally, “Make America Great Again” deploys 
another populist tactic in which nostalgia is activated, furthering 
the populist claim that a return to an earlier and better social and 
economic reality is both possible and desirable (Kazin, 1995, pp. 
29, 39; Kenny, 2017, p. 263). It is this combination of nationalist 
and populist elements that often earns the phenomenon character-
ized by Trump’s rhetoric described above the name of “nationalist 
populism” or alternatively, populist nationalism (Gusterson, 2017, 
p. 209). Trump’s populist nationalism has found an effective plat-
form on social media. While social media has remained a prima-
ry method of communication for Trump’s rhetoric throughout his 
campaigns and presidency, and there are multiple occasions that 
can attest to this, this case study will provide a close analysis of one 
significant instance of Trump’s online communication during the 
2018 migrant caravan.
In 2018, coinciding with the moments leading up to the U.S. 
midterm elections, thousands of migrants traveled across Central 
America to the US-Mexico border “fleeing persecution, poverty, 
and violence in their home countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and 
El Salvador” with the goal of obtaining asylum in the U.S. Trump’s 
rhetoric surrounding the 2018 migrant caravan had political impli-
cations for the midterm elections, as characterized by his warnings 
to the American people. For instance, Trump stated, “if you don’t 
want America to be overrun by masses of illegal aliens and giant 
caravans, you’d better vote Republican” (BBC News, 2018). The 
intersection of Trump’s rhetoric surrounding this mass migration, 
which he characterized as “an invasion,” and his particular use of 
social media platforms (primarily Twitter) to spread this rhetoric’s 
inherent populist-nationalism is explored below through a close 
analysis of one of his tweets at the time (BBC News, 2018). 
Less than a month before the 2018 midterm elections, Trump took 
to Twitter to express his opposition to the migrant caravan (Lind, 
2018). On October 18, 2018, he tweeted: “I am watching the Dem-
ocrat Party led (because they want Open Borders and existing 
weak laws) assault on our country by Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador, whose leaders are doing little to stop this large flow of 
people, INCLUDING MANY CRIMINALS, from entering Mexi-
co to U.S.....” (Lind, 2018). Trump’s employment of social media 
to propagate his populist-nationalist rhetoric is thus evident in the 
manner through which he uses tweets to generate a populist con-
struction of the Democratic Party as an illegitimate ruling class, a 
nationalist/populist-nationalist construction of outsiders by sowing 
fear towards immigrants (which incorporates emotionally-driven 
language), and a populist conspiratorial perception of the Demo-
cratic Party and the migrant caravan (through misinformation).
Throughout his campaigns and presidency, Trump has portrayed 
the Democratic Party as a party that caters to elite interests and 
that has not upheld the will of the people; he has thus, in popu-
list fashion, posited himself as someone who will advocate for the 
American people, “challeng[ing] the dominant order and giv[ing] 
a voice to the collective will” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191). In 
this tweet, Trump furthers this perception of the Democratic Party 
by portraying them as a common enemy of the American people 
whose interests—according to Trump, “open borders and existing 
weak laws”—are at odds with what the people want. Social media 
proves to be an effective platform to convey this populist message: 
Twitter serves as a “direct linkage to ‘the people’” allowing Trump 
to bypass traditional media outlets (a medium that is considered to 
be beholden to elite influence) to reach vast networks of the cit-
izenry rapidly (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1110). The bypassing of 
mainstream media can lend Trump more credibility as the “voice 
for ‘the people.’”
In addition to social media’s ability to bypass traditional news or-
ganizations and to provide a platform for the construction of the 
voice of the collective will, Twitter’s features as a discursive space 
can also create an environment that is apt for populist rhetoric. For 
instance, Twitter’s character count favors the simplification of mes-
sages. This simplified language maps unto traditional populist dis-
course, which is characterized by being “simple, direct, emotional, 
and frequently indelicate” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191). Trump’s 
use of Twitter to convey his condemnation of the migrant caravan 
gives him the appearance of “telling it like it is,” since he is directly 
addressing “the people,” and allows him to use the kind of direct, 
everyday language that is characteristic of populist appeals (En-
gesser et al., 2017, p. 1110). 
Social media platforms are also conducive to the kind of emotion-
ality that is associated with both populist and nationalist discourses. 
As explored earlier, emotions are central to social media experi-
ences. Emotions can drive the formation of online groups and they 
can increase the likelihood of a message being propagated and am-
plified. Trump’s rhetoric of a national “assault” and his construc-
tion of immigrants as criminals work towards the nationalistic (and 
nativist) pursuit of  horizontally constructing in- and out- groups 
by instilling feelings of fear, anxiety, and outrage towards an out-
group who is perceived as a threat to the standing of the dominant 
social group (the nation); it is these kinds of negative, emotional-
ly-charged messages that thrive on social platforms, contributing to 
the amplification of Trump’s populist-nationalist rhetoric. 
Populism, particularly right-wing populism, can also incorporate 
conspiratorial elements in its discourse; a study conducted by Eric 
Oliver and Wendy M. Rahn found that individuals who support 
populism’s anti-elitism are “far more likely to endorse conspiracy 
theories of all types than not” (2016, p. 198). Trump’s tweet pro-
poses two unsubstantiated theories that can promote conspiratorial 
thinking, positing that the migrant caravan “includ[es] many crim-
inals” and is a “Democrat[ic] Party led” occurrence. Without the 
fact-checking function that traditional news sources (are meant to) 
provide, Trump’s baseless claims on Twitter can be directly trans-
mitted to the American public, allowing these conspiratorial state-
ments to go uncorrected and to be amplified with the help of social 
platforms. 
This amplification of Trump’s claims is further heightened by the 
ease with which fake news may be spread on social media. Misin-
formation, in the form of inaccurate “fake news” articles and im-
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ages, can be spread through social media platforms and have the 
impact of corroborating Trump’s claims, lending his conspiratorial, 
populist-nationalist rhetoric more credibility. For instance, viral im-
ages at the time of the migrant caravan falsely claimed the migrants 
“were carrying dangerous diseases” and had injured “Mexican po-
lice officers…in bloody street fights” (Roose, 2018). Therefore, so-
cial media platforms provided a space for misinformation to spread 
rapidly and provide unfounded support for Trump’s populist-na-
tionalist rhetoric that constructed migrants as threats to the nation 
and framed the Democratic Party as an elite and disconnected rul-
ing party that was working against the interests of the American 
people by supporting and even organizing the caravan. 
CONCLUSION
Social media platforms have provided an effective medium for the 
increasing interplay between nationalist and populist discourse. 
The elective affinity between social media and populism—derived 
from social media’s perceived ability to communicate the “voice 
of the people” and its distance from the media establishment— the 
centrality of emotion within social media and within populist-na-
tionalist discourse, and the amplification of conspiratorial think-
ing (characteristic of right-wing populism and heightened through 
“fake news”) have allowed social media platforms to become an ef-
fective site for populist-nationalist discourse. As social media con-
tinues to become integrated into our everyday realities, questions 
surrounding the extent of its role in the construction and propaga-
tion of populist-nationalist discourse become increasingly relevant. 
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